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Abstract
Pension reform is now on the national agenda in most post-Soviet countries.
These countries have highly informalized economies, which means that large areas of
economic activity go unreported to the authorities. This paper deals with the problem of
pension reform in a highly informalized post-Soviet economy, Ukraine. It includes an
analysis of causes and consequences of informalization, a general description and
analysis of trends in the Ukrainian pension system, and a discussion of different
approaches to reform. The paper describes an approach to modeling labor and capital
flows between the formal and informal sectors using a gravity model. It also reports and
discusses results of simulations of different scenarios of pension reform in Ukraine.
Policy-relevant findings of the study are as follows:
• Public trust in reform is crucial.  Therefore, in designing and implementing  reforms
exceptional attention should be paid to trust-building measures;
• Debt-financed transition to a fully-funded pension system in an informalized post-
Soviet economy can lead to higher efficiency gains than a tax-financed transition.
This is due to an alleviation of the tax burden, which encourages a decline in
unreported economic activity.
• Provided that public trust in the reform is sufficient, the larger the fully-funded
system, the greater will be the decline in informalization.
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POST-SOVIET ECONOMY
Anton Dobronogov
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1. INTRODUCTION
The problem of pension reform is currently on the national agenda of many
countries. One can classify modern pension systems according to two methods of
benefit calculation - "defined benefit" (DB, which means that the pension level is
determined by the history of a person’s wages and working record) or "defined
contributions" (DC, which means that a pension level is determined by a person’s
contributions to the system); two types of financing - "fully-funded" (FF, which means
that workers invest some part of their earnings to special retirement accounts and
“dissave” this money after retirement) or "pay-as-you-go" (PAYG, which means that
contributions of the current generation of workers are directly transferred to the current
generation of retirees); and two forms of management - privately or publicly managed.
A country might have a pension system of one type or combine systems of different
types.
The system which currently dominates is the publicly managed pay-as-you-go
defined-benefit system, which is the most sensitive (and therefore vulnerable) to
demographic changes and, in addition, causes relatively high labor market distortions.
This creates different incentives for pension reform in different countries. In
industrialized economies the necessity of reform is caused, first of all, by the trend of
population aging, which resulted from a strong decrease in fertility rates in the last 40
years of the 20th century. For most of the developing countries the main reason for
reform is underdevelopment of the current pension systems, which have both a low
participation ratio and provide a low pension level. For post-Soviet economies the
objective of reforms is both, to overcome the impacts of population aging, and to adapt
the pension system to the socioeconomic context of the market economy. The presence
of a large informal sector in the two latter cases, where the share of this sector usually
varies between 25% and 65% of the economy, is a significant consideration, and should
be taken into account during planning and implementation of any reform.
An “informal sector” is present in all types of modern societies. The reasons for
its existence, however, differ from country to country. In developed western economies,
where the informal sectors are relatively small, among the factors promoting
informalization are (Leiter and Tedstrom, 1997): high official production costs, high
official unemployment and relatively high minimum wage rates that discourage
2employers from hiring the unemployed, and significant restrictions on employment of
foreign workers. In Latin America, where the share of the informal sector is comparable
to that in the former USSR, the incentives for the informal sector are as follows
(Loayza, 1997): high costs of entering the formal market due to numerous licenses and
other requirements, extremely long procedures of enterprise registration, high taxes,
administrative overregulation of the formal sector of the economy. Informalization in a
post-Soviet economy has its specific features, which we will discuss further.
The objective of this paper is to analyze possible approaches to pension reform
in the highly informalized transition economy of Ukraine. The following section gives
the policy background for this paper, including an analysis of causes and consequences
of the informalization of the economy in Ukraine, a general description and analysis of
trends in the Ukrainian pension system, and a discussion of different approaches to the
pension reform in the country. The third section is dedicated to the description of the
approach to the model-based analysis of the options for pension reform in an economy
with a large informal sector. It discusses the goals of the modeling, provides a general
description of a two-sector (formal and informal) model of the economy, as well as an
approach for modeling labor flows between the formal and informal sectors, as well as
capital flows inside and outside the economy. Section 4 describes the set of scenarios
for simulations, reports and discusses their results. The fifth section is reserved for
concluding remarks.
2. POLICY BACKGROUND
2.1. Informalization of the economy: causes and consequences
The phenomenon of informalization has been very common in the former Soviet
countries in the 1990s - Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) studied 11 countries in the
region and discovered that the share of the informal sector in total GDP exceeds 30% in
7 of them. For a better understanding this phenomenon one needs to investigate both the
long-term and short-term causes.
2.1.1. Deep roots: informal economy in the Soviet Union
The long-term roots of the present situation lie in the Soviet era. The Soviet
Union, like any country in the world, had an informal sector in its economy. The factors
causing its appearance and development, however, were not quite the same as those of
market economies. As already mentioned, in the latter case the main incentives for both
employers and workers to informalize production and labor are the desire to evade taxes
and labor market restrictions. In socialist economies, the main factor was an attempt by
the state to eliminate virtually all individual economic decisions. Almost all property in
the country belonged to the state and was often considered “up for grabs”, nearly all
private productive activities were prohibited, virtually all prices and trade as whole were
under state control, a wide range of consumer goods and services was banned for
ideological reasons. Such overregulation itself created incentives for the development of
informal activities. In addition, central economic planning acted as a drag anchor on the
formal production and distribution mechanisms, leading to the development of huge
3horizontal informal networks, vertical patron-client links and corruption. These factors
help to fuel economic informalization (Grossman, 1989). In terms of social protection
the state provided both explicit social transfer systems such as the PAYG DB pension
system, and implicit mechanisms such as full employment, free medical care, subsidized
food, housing and other services. Such mechanisms were mostly irrelevant to a person’s
reported earnings, which produced additional incentives for informalization.
Specific types of informalization were responsible for specific types of informal
activity. The goal of a company in a market economy is maximization of profits. The
goal of a company in a socialist economy was the implementation of the plan. This led
to overreporting (a situation where the state company reports about never-produced
output), which is cited by Borodiuk and Turchinov (1999) as one of the most frequent
informal activities in the Soviet economy. Among other informal activities were large-
scale plundering of state-owned material, technical and financial resources; mass small-
scale misappropriations in the state and cooperative sectors of the economy, clandestine
business and production activity, production of non-accounted goods, unofficial
provision of services, resale of household appliances and foodstuffs outside the
framework of state trade (speculation), criminal lines of business, and corruption (ibid).
It was a difficult task to make systematic estimates of the scale of the informal
economy for both Soviet scholars (due to ideological reasons) and western researchers
(due to the lack of data). The results of the Berkeley-Duke studies on the second
economy in the Soviet Union, however, might be taken as first approximations of an
estimation of the size of the informal sector. In Grossman (1987) private income was
estimated to be between 28 and 33 percent of the total household income. According to
Treml (1992) the second economy employed between 10 and 12 percent of the total
labor force. Many papers (Brezinski, 1983, Grossman, 1989, Treml and Alexeev, 1993)
observe that there was rapid growth of the second economy in the USSR in the 1970s
and 1980s.
There are different opinions about the impact of informalization on the stability
of the Soviet economy. Brezinski (1983) argued that “the second economy has a
stabilizing impact on economy which works to the benefit of Soviet leadership”. On the
other hand, Treml and Alexeev (1993) concluded that the second economy “contributed
to the deterioration of the Soviet economic performance in the 1970s and 1980s”. In
1990 the authors of the “500 days” economic reforms program expected that 90% of the
informal economic activities would be absorbed by the emerging (formal) free markets
(Shatalin et al., 1990). However, in reality this did not happen. One possible reason was
that the growth of the informal economy in the late Soviet period was both a cause and
consequence of the deterioration of personal and societal morals which were the result
of differences in ideology and "natural" behavior. The next subsection will try to
analyze how this factor influenced the huge increase of informal activities, which was
observed in the 1990s.
42.1.2. Informalization in the transition period
In the early 1990s Ukraine started a process of triple transition: from
totalitarianism to democracy, from central planning to a market economy, from being
part of the Soviet Union to being an independent state. This extremely complex social
process led to many turbulent social and economic developments, one of which was the
informalization of the economy. The share of the informal sector reached, according to
different estimates, 40-60 percent of  total GDP. Virtually all enterprises today operate
either in the informal sector only, or both in the formal and informal sectors. To analyze
the different forms of informalization, we will use the framework proposed by
Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996). They hypothesize the following factors as playing an
important role in influencing the costs and benefits of an enterprise operating
unofficially, and thus its decision of whether, and to what extent, it will be operating
unofficially.  They include the:
• degree of political liberalization versus repression;
• extent of underdevelopment in the rule of law and related institutional enforcement
mechanisms in a market economy;
• degree of administrative control versus economic liberalization of the official
economy;
• official tax burden;
• extent of macroeconomic instability;  and
• type of activity.
The Soviet system was essentially based on "fear", which is of course
incompatible with political and economic freedom. The society, and especially its
bureaucratic system, was built on vertical relations of authority and dependency. Due to
the process of political liberalization, which started in the 1980s, the fear factor strongly
decreased, but since democratic traditions were absent in the country, this did not lead
to the development of horizontal relations of reciprocity and co-operation. Rather, and
especially in power structures, it led to greater freedom to engage in corruption,
“shadowization” of public finance, illegal privatization, and misappropriation of the
state-owned assets.
Every component of the triple transition needed by itself a development of new
legislation and a new institutional framework. However, national authorities neither had
the skills nor enough resources for such an endeavor1. This caused chaos in the legal
and institutional framework of the economy, which led to the development of informal
“rules of the game”, tax evading, increase of criminal activities, and plunder of
enterprises and other organizations.
As already mentioned, the economy in the Soviet Union was extremely
overregulated. Since many of the people making economic decisions in Ukraine remain
                                                
1
 Putnam (1993) quotes Bates (1988), saying that “both absolute power and absence of power
can be corrupting, for both instill a sense of irresponsibility”. In the 1990s the Ukrainian
bureaucratic system combined both absolute power (in terms of the spirit) and absence of power
(in terms of skills to manage democratic society and market economy).
5the same, they have continued their efforts to control the economic activity in
essentially the same way. This has led to a very high degree of official administrative
control, some of which are of a non-economic nature. For example, the so-called
“kartoteka # 2” is a regulation, according to which all money paid into the account of an
indebted enterprise is automatically transferred to its creditors.  After ideological tools
for control were eliminated, the state started to use the tax system as the main tool for
the administrative control of the economy.  A lack of economic expertise within
national authorities, however, gave rise to a quite unreasonable tax system which
changed frequently. For example, in 1992 corporate income was taxed according to
income, in the first quarter of 1993 according to profits, from the second quarter of 1993
until the end of 1994 by income again, and in 1995 to 1998 by profits. Changes in the
tax base were combined with changes in tax rates – downward changes in profit tax
rates (from 45% in 1991 to 30% in 1995) and upward changes in income tax rates (from
18% in 1992 to 22% in 1994). The top marginal personal income tax attained 90% in
1993 (Luzik, 1999) while social contributions reached the level of 52% in 1997, though
were reduced to 39% in 1999. Not surprisingly administrative controls and the heavy
tax burden led to a concealment of real profits by enterprises and entrepreneurial
structures and an increase in share of unreported economic activities.
The macroeconomic situation was extremely unstable in Ukraine in the 1990s.
Real formal GDP in 1997 was reduced by 54.3% compared to 1990, and there was
hyperinflation (in 1991-95 the inflation index ranged from 280 to 10,260% per year). As
mentioned before, this macroeconomic chaos was complemented (and partially caused)
by the instability in the fiscal legislation and led to the "dollarization" of the economy,
capital flight abroad and barter transactions.
Macroeconomic instability combined with the absence of capital necessary for
investment led to the development, first of all, of economic activities such as trade and
commerce, which bring relatively quick returns (something which had been relatively
underdeveloped in Soviet times). These activities tend to become more informal than,
for instance, the activities of large industrial enterprises, and this fact also contributed to
the informalization process.
2.1.3. Consequences of the informalization
Informalization of the economy in Ukraine has had both positive and negative
consequences. As already mentioned the absence of a legal and institutional framework
for the development of the market economy, as well as an ineffective governmental
macroeconomic policy, led to very unfavorable business conditions. Informalization
provided possibilities to maintain economic activities (including means to accumulate
shadow capital required for this purpose) and thus means to survive and improve the
living standards of the majority of citizens (Borodiuk and Turchinov, 1999). The
negative consequences of informalization, however, are, on balance, greater than its
benefits (Kaufmann and Kaliberda, 1996). Most importantly, it has undermined
effective management of the economy by the government, reduced tax revenues and
thus increased public debt (according to different estimations, funds needed to serve
external Ukrainian debt might be between 9% and 12% of the country’s GDP), and
6diminished state expenditures on science, education, health care, and the pension
system. It has also increased criminality (in particular the growth of organized crime),
thus increasing transaction costs associated with bribes, poor contract enforcement, and
low property security. It also decreased the attractiveness of the country to foreign
investors and, as noted above, promoted capital flight. Finally, due to the prevailing
short-term perspective in the informal sector, it has virtually eliminated long-term
investments.  This in turn has slowed down the development of financial markets in the
country and led to a growing technological gap compared with other economies.
2.2. Pension system in Ukraine: status and trends
With the above as context we now turn to a brief description of the current state,
trends, and needs for improvement in the Ukrainian pension system. More detailed
analysis is given in Dobronogov (1998) and in Appendix 1.
The Ukrainian pension system is a publicly managed pay-as-you-go defined-
benefit system. The social security tax ratio is 33% of wages, 32% of which are paid by
the employers and 1% by the employees. The standard retirement age in Ukraine is 60
years for men and 55 years for women; the working record necessary to get full pension
is 25 years for men and 20 years for women. In this sense it is very generous system in
comparison with western countries where retirement ages and the qualifying periods are
higher.
Despite the fact that the share of pension fund expenditures in GDP remained
practically constant during the years of transition, the deep economic crisis taking place
in Ukraine during the past several years had an inevitable impact on the financial state
of the pension system. The decrease in production, for example, resulted in a sharp
reduction of the real budget of the pension fund. As a result of informalization and
delays in payment of wages, around 7.5 million people make either delayed
contributions or no contributions to the pension fund, thereby raising the effective
system dependency between current pensioners and contributors (Libanova, 1998).
One of the disadvantages of the Ukrainian pension system is the very high level
of contributions to the pension fund paid by the employers. These contributions are 32%
of the total amount of wages, with an additional 5.5% being paid to the employment
fund and the social insurance fund. This encourages employers to decrease formal
wages, which leads to a labor flow into the informal sector and this in turn has a
negative impact on both the pension system and the national economy as a whole.
A reduction of the pension level has taken place as a result of the reduction in
real contributions to the pension fund. In spring 2000 the average monthly pension (70.0
hryvnias; approximately USD 13) was about the same as the minimum cost of food
(69.6 hrn); most retirees received a pension that was less than the official poverty line
(90.7 hrn). The delays in wage payments also caused non-payments to the pension fund
which amounted to 1,310 million hrn in April 2000 and, as a result, pension arrears,
which amounted to 1,310.2 million hrn (1.3 of total monthly benefits or 1.0% of the
71999 GDP). Hence, the living standard provided by the Ukrainian pension system for
the retirees should be judged as being very poor.
As mentioned before, the retirement age in Ukraine is relatively low. In addition,
in the 1990s the Ukrainian parliament accepted a series of legislative acts that increased
the number of people entitled to early retirement (representatives of about 20
professions have such an entitlement nowadays). As a result, the real average retirement
age decreased to 58 years for men and to 54 years for women. The average working
record (according to official data for 1996) was 36 years for men and 29 years for
women, and the real average term of contributions to the pension fund was 30 years for
men and 21 years for women. Life expectancy at the average retirement age is 15.1
years for men and 23.1 years for women. Taking into account that an average salary for
a relatively short term is used to calculate a pension, there is the possibility that an
individual’s pension would considerably exceed his/her contributions to the pension
fund (Libanova and Yatsenko, 1997). A further threat to the viability of the pension
system is the clear trend towards population aging (Figure 1).
According to IIASA’s population projections, and assuming the retirement age
remains constant, the demographic dependency ratio (persons in retirement age per
persons in working age) will increase from 0.41 in 1997 to 0.56 in 2027. Consequently,
if the current pension system is maintained, the "affordable" system replacement ratio
(i.e. average pension assuming no deficit in pension fund divided by average wage) will
significantly decrease (Figure 2). As was shown in Dobronogov (1998), pension reform
in the country is unlikely to be possible unless there is an increase in retirement age.
The pension system of Ukraine is highly redistributive and has considerable
disadvantages from the viewpoint of equity and fairness. For most retirees it is
effectively a “flat benefit” system, because the lack of money in the pension fund has
resulted in a very low maximum pension level where the duration of their working
record and their average wage levels have usually not been reflected in the pension
levels, because most people are entitled to maximum pension or one close to the
maximum. On the other hand, according to the "status" laws of Ukraine, there are
certain categories of people who can get pensions several times higher than the usual
maximum pension. Therefore, the differentiation of pension levels is both socially
unfair and economically inefficient, which in turn creates labor market distortions.
Another problem is that the working record requirements that should be fulfilled to get a
full pension are too generous. To calculate  pension levels, the average monthly wages
over a short period2 of time are taken into account. There is a maximum pension level,
but there is no maximum wage level above which earnings do not require contributions
to the pension fund.
The social unfairness and financial problems of the pension system are leading
to intergenerational conflict. The current generation of retirees, who used to finance the
old pension system during their working life, receive a pension of much lower
purchasing power than in previous years. At the same time, the current working
                                                
2
 See Appendix 1 for details.
8population realize that if the current pension system is maintained, they will not receive
an appropriate pension themselves, which increases their reluctance to finance the
system, and encourages them to evade social security tax.
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Figure 2. Projections of affordable replacement ratio calculated by different
models.
Source: based on calculations by IIASA, HIID, and PADCO discussed at the
meeting of international pension experts working in Ukraine in November 1999.
Summarizing, the existing Ukrainian pension system still contains many features of
the former Soviet system, some of which make its effective functioning under present
conditions impossible. Maintaining this system will inevitably lead to a series of
negative consequences, including:
• A further deterioration of the living standards of retirees;
• The necessity of a further increase in social security taxes, and, as a result, increases
in labor force costs, a reduction in demand for labor, and an increase in the informal
sector in the economy;
• The necessity to increase pension system spending, and, as a result, an increase of
the budget deficit, and a reduction of budget expenditures in other spheres such as
health care, science, and education, which will lead to a deceleration of economic
growth;
• Aggravation of intergenerational tensions.
Thus, there is a clear necessity to undertake pension reform in Ukraine. The next
subsection will be dedicated to the problem how to design the reform.
2.3. Different approaches to the pension reform and their possible impacts on
informalization of the economy
There are two principal types of pension reform, which might be considered
suitable in Ukraine.
1. Parametric reform. This type of reform means that only some parameters of the
current pension system are to be changed, while the basic structure of the system
remains the same. Given demographic trends in the country, it is unlikely to be possible
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to overcome or significantly alleviate the severe problems of the Ukrainian pension
system using only such measures. However, parametric reform of the current system
might be quite useful as a part of more radical transformation. In particular, an increase
of retirement age, an increase in qualifying years, the elimination of the non-payment
periods from the working record for pension eligibility, an improvement of the link
between contributions and pensions, a decrease in number of early-age retirees, total or
partial cancellation of pensions for those who continue to work, and a shift of the social
pensions from the pension fund to the state budget would improve the chances of
successful pension reform.
2. Reform based on the concept of notional defined-contribution (NDC) accounts.
Such a reform has been implemented in Latvia (De Castello Branco, 1998). The concept
is that future benefits are calculated on the basis of a person’s contributions to a notional
individual account with the “rate of return” determined by the government, taking into
account economic and demographic indicators. No real funds are accumulated into the
accounts, and financing the current cohort of retirees is based on payroll contributions.
In other words, this is a PAYG DC system. In a further stage of reform Latvia is going
to introduce into the pension system a privately managed FF DC pillar. Pension reform
based on the NDC concept might cause a slight shift of labor from the informal to the
formal sector, mainly due to improving the link between contributions and benefits and
thus encouraging participation in the pension system and, consequently, in the formal
sector. However, this is unlikely to cause any significant decrease of the informalization
of the economy, since, as we show below, returns to PAYG contributions, and therefore
the attractiveness of participation in the system for people, will remain low during next
several decades.
3. Partial or total replacement of the current system by a fully-funded defined-
contribution system. Such a reform seems to be highly desirable for Ukraine since it
might solve, at least partially, the above-mentioned problems of the Ukrainian pension
system, as well as have a number of positive impacts on the development of the national
economy. In particular, it would encourage the shift of wage payment from the informal
to the formal sector, and promote the development of financial markets as well as  the
creation of capital stock for investment in the formal sector of the economy (Snelbecker,
1999). However, there are numerous problems complicating this type of reform, which
have been shown, in particular, by the experience of Kazakhstan, where a radical variant
of such a reform was adopted in 1997 (currently, 15.5% out of the former 25.5% payroll
contributions are to be paid to the PAYG system, and 10% to the FF DC system; the
rate of contributions to the PAYG system is to gradually decline to 0). Among the
problems are the low level of public trust in both state and private financial structures;
macroeconomic instability in the state, an insufficient development of financial
institutions, and, as a result, the absence of necessary saving mechanisms; the lack of
professionals in the field of pension insurance; the impossibility of insuring against
many risks such as inflation, economic recession, investment mistakes, long life, etc.
(Wiener, 1998, UNDP, 1997). Another important issue is financing the transition.
Although outstanding pension liability in Ukraine is relatively small – depending on
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method of calculation it might be between 65% and 141% of GDP, which is
considerably lower than, for instance, in Poland, where this indicator is between 153%
and 218% (Snelbecker, 1999) – the country has both a very high tax burden in the
formal sector and high public debt, which complicates transition financing. One of the
possible solutions to this problem is as follows: during the first period of the reform a
considerable part of the funds of the FF system might be invested into the special low-
interest government bonds and used for financing the pensions of current cohorts of
retirees. Eventually, along with solving the problems mentioned earlier, the increasing
share of funds of the FF tier could be invested into the private sector, both in Ukraine
and overseas (the latter would alleviate the problem of underdevelopment of financial
markets in the country). This concept of the reform would not significantly increase
public debt, but would rather make implicit pension liabilities explicit, thus encouraging
participation in the system, and at the same time providing a smooth shift from one type
of pension system to another.
Pension reform based on the introduction of a substantial FF tier into the system
might influence three of the six factors forming our framework for analyzing the impact
on the informal economy (see page 4). In the long run it might decrease macroeconomic
instability by partially or completely eliminating the budget deficit necessary to cope
with a rising pension system dependency ratio. It might also influence the distribution of
the type of activities in the economy, promoting activities, which need long-run
investments. The major impact of the reform on the informalization might be a decrease
in the official tax burden because of a decrease of the social security tax rate. This tax,
however, will be replaced by contributions to the FF tier. In this regard, the important
issue is the public trust in the new pension system. If people trust the system, they will
not consider contributions to individual accounts as a tax, but rather as a part of their
income. If they distrust the system and believe that they may lose money accumulated
in their individual retirement accounts, they will not make a difference between paying
taxes and FF contributions. This factor is likely to have an impact on the participation
ratio, and thus on the reform’s influence on redistribution of labor between the formal
and informal sectors and on the size of capital stock invested in the formal sector.
The important question is how large the share of the PAYG and FF components of
the pension system should be. The current draft law “On mandatory state pension
insurance” being developed by the government of Ukraine suggests that contributions to
the PAYG pension system should be gradually (during four years) reduced from 33% to
26% and contributions to the FF pillar should be gradually increased to 7%. Let us
analyze the consequences of implementation of this scenario. Figure 3 shows the
replacement ratio (defined as average pension divided by average wage) provided by the
PAYG system under the assumption that the pension fund does not have any deficit and
this draft law is passed. Since the draft law envisages a gradual increase of the pension
age for both men and women up to 65, while allowing for early retirement
(accompanied by a simultaneous reduction of pension payments), two variants of
implementation of the draft law were considered in our analysis. Under the “optimistic”
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scenario the effective retirement age was increased to 65 years, and under the “realistic”
scenario it increases to 63 years for men and 60 years for women.
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Figure. 3. Projections of the replacement ratio provided by the PAYG pension
system under the no-deficit scenario.
Source: IIASA model3.
Such a considerable decrease of the replacement ratio (in the mid-term perspective it
may even become lower than the contribution rate to the PAYG pension system) is
likely to precipitate the further reluctance of employees to participate in this system as
well as to promote a continuing informalization of the Ukraine’s economy. Let us look
at the situation from the viewpoint of a male cohort, which is going to be 20 years old in
2003. Our calculations show that the real internal rate of return of the PAYG pension
system, based on this draft law, for this cohort will be very low (or even negative given
pessimistic assumptions on fertility rate, Table 1). From a microeconomic perspective,
this could reduce the participation in the system and lead, therefore, to a continuation
(or even an increase) in the informalization of labor, which in turn will impact
negatively on the pension system and the economy as a whole.
Table 1. Real internal rate of return of the PAYG system for different demographic
scenarios
Equilibrium total fertility rate4 0.9 1.1 1.3 (baseline) 1.5 1.8
Real internal rate of return, % -0.3 -0.1 0.1 0.3 0.5
Source: IIASA model.
                                                
3
 Selected assumptions used for these and further simulations are presented in Appendix 2.
4
 We assume that during 20 years the total fertility rate will change from the current level of 1.3 to some
equilibrium level and will then  remain constant.
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Figure 4. Revenues and expenditures of the PAYG pillar assuming a replacement
ratio of 38%.
Source: IIASA model.
It has been proposed  that the long-term financial problems of the PAYG pension
system may be resolved through the creation of strategic reserves, which might be spent
when the demographic situation worsens significantly. However, the creation of such a
reserve fund does not seem to be feasible, since the PAYG system is vulnerable to
political risks, and because of the sharp decrease in the replacement ratio, shown in
Figure 3, any surplus of the system is likely to be channeled into raising pension
payments instead of the creation of a reserve fund. Another alternative is the creation of
a pension fund deficit. Figure 4 shows the possible amount of pension fund deficit if the
replacement ratio amounts to 38%. However, this approach does not seem feasible
either, as it is not clear how such a deficit could be financed.
The introduction of a fully-funded pillar of the pension system might be the only
chance to reduce the pressure of demographic trends on the financial status of Ukraine’s
pension system. At the same time, a fully-funded system is characterized by high level
of administrative expenses. The experiences of countries which introduced fully-funded
systems show that these expenditures do not depend significantly on the rate of
contributions to fully-funded system.  Rather, they tend to be a certain portion of the
total wage bill. The average rate for nine Latin American countries which have fully-
funded systems amounts to 1.84% (James et al., 1999). This actually implies that the
lower the contribution rate to the fully-funded system, the higher will be the share of
contributions to cover administrative expenses and, hence, the lower the profitability of
the system.  Table 2 shows the internal rate of return of the PAYG and FF components
of the pension system for periods 10 and 20 years following the beginning of the
working career and at the retirement age for the cohort described above.
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Table 2. Internal rate of return of different pillars of the pension system for different
scenarios of reform
Contribution rate,
% of taxation base
Internal rate of return, %
PAYG
Pillar
FF pillar PAYG
pillar
FF pillar, after
10 years of
contributions
FF pillar, after
20 years of
contributions
FF pillar, at
retirement
26 7 0.1 -4.5 0.0 2.3
22 11 0.1 0.0 1.7 3.0
18 15 0.2 0.4 1.9 3.1
Source: IIASA model.
These results show that the pension reform scenario presented in the draft law is
likely to result in a negative internal rate of return of the fully-funded system for at least
20 years. In practice, this may precipitate a loss of public trust in reforms and, hence,
further reluctance of employees to participate in the pension system and consequently
further informalization of the economy. Second, the internal rate of return of the fully-
funded system is higher if the contribution rate to the FF system is higher, which,
assuming that the FF system works properly, eventually leads to the increase in the
aggregate pension payments.
3. MODELING THE PENSION REFORM IN AN ECONOMY WITH A LARGE
INFORMAL SECTOR
3.1 Goals of the modeling
As we have already shown earlier (Dobronogov, 1998), pension reform based on
the introduction of the FF DC component into the pension system is unlikely to be
possible in Ukraine unless the share of the informal sector in the economy decreases.
However, the informal sector share will not decrease by itself, without systemic
economic reforms to eliminate incentives to informalize labor and capital. To what
extent and with which preconditions would the FF DC element of pension reform
contribute to a decrease in informalization? Introduction of the FF DC component into
the pension system would usually be expected to promote economic growth due to the
capitalization of the economy. In an economy with a large informal sector the same
effect could result from a decrease in informalization, assuming that the formal sector
is, or will become, more efficient than the informal one. How would different scenarios
based on the introduction of a FF DC component influence the total output in the
Ukrainian economy? These are some of the general questions we need to address, but
there are some more specific questions too.
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Since incomes of retirees are extremely low now, it is obvious that neither
current nor future retirees can reasonably be expected to bear the burden of the shift
from the PAYG DB to the FF DC or a multipillar pension system. Rather, this burden
should be met by working-age cohorts. Two approaches to financing the shift are
possible: tax-financed or debt-financed transition. It is generally agreed that for OECD-
type economies long-run efficiency gains of tax-financed transition exceed those of
debt-financed transition. “The costs of it [i.e. tax-financed transition] are, first, no
efficiency gains in the first generation, second, greater overall financial contributions of
the current generation” (Sachs, 1999). In the stagnating Ukrainian economy with its
large informal sector and heavy tax burden, these costs could be too high for the formal
sector. In turn, a decrease in the share of the formal sector, which tends to have higher
productivity growth due to lower transactions costs, would have a negative impact on
the general efficiency of the economy. As has been shown in Snelbecker (1999), in
Ukraine under some sets of conditions, including a tipping tendency in the economy
(i.e., a trend towards either a very large or a very small informal sector), a debt-financed
transition could lead more quickly to a higher growth path than a tax-financed
transition. The first question then is what will be the impact of different types of shift
financing on the share of the informal sector of the economy and on total GDP?
The conclusion about the higher long-term efficiency of tax-financed transition
for OECD-type economies is also based on the assumption that contributions to FF DC
are not viewed as a tax, and thus do not impose any additional distortions on the labor
market. In Ukraine, however, households have recently lost their savings due to
hyperinflation and dubious financial schemes such as pyramid selling. Therefore, the
level of public trust in both public and private financial institutions is already low; thus
workers are likely to distrust pension funds and view contributions to the FF DC system
as a tax. To be more specific, how might the "trust factor" influence the impact of
pension reform on the informalization of the economy and total GDP?
Finally, different proportions of the PAYG and FF tiers are possible within a
reformed pension system.  How might the size of the FF tier influence the
informalization of the economy and total GDP?
Our simulations are directed at answering all these questions.
3.2. Two-sector model of the national economy
This model is an extension of the economic demographic model developed by
IIASA’s Social Security Reform Project (MacKellar and Ermolieva, 1999). This is a
two-sector (formal and informal) neoclassic model employing the Cobb-Douglas
production function. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in sector i is calculated as
) i(tLi )
i(tKtg)( i (t)(t) = GDPi
−
+
11
where
)(tK i is total capital in sector i;
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)(tLi  is total labor in sector i;
g is the average rate of total factor productivity growth;
α(t) is a scaling factor (usually a constant);
βi is an exogenous coefficient.
The gross profit rate (i.e., including depreciation and indirect taxes)  is calculated as
(t)]Ki / (t)GDPi[ i = (t)iR β
and the average wage rate in sector i is
[ ])( )()1()( tL tGDPii i itw β−=
The model tracks receipts and disbursements, and thus net savings, by the
institutional sector (households, firms, and government). The capital of the formal
sector consists of residential capital, capital operated by private unincorporated
enterprises (PUEs), and capital operated by firms (i.e., corporate enterprises). Capital in
the informal sector includes residential capital (apartments and houses rented without
declaring received income) and capital of PUEs (i.e., firms operate only in the formal
sector). In both sectors imputed rents (in the case of residential capital) and the profits
of PUEs accrue directly to the households.
In the formal sector firms earn profits, pay taxes and distribute dividends to
holders of claims. These claims are held on behalf of households by two financial
intermediaries: the fully-funded defined-contribution pension system (DCPS) and other
institutions (OIs), which include banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, and other
financial intermediaries apart from pension funds. Implicitly, OIs also include
individual households, to the extent that the latter directly hold financial claims.
Both labor and capital flow between sectors. The only exception is claims held
by the fully-funded defined-contribution pension system. We assume that this portion of
capital by definition belongs to the formal sector, since, due to long-term nature of FF,
pension system corporate governance of pension funds will do their best to prevent
informalization of the assets. The capital allocated in the informal sector may flow
abroad.
Persons of working age earn wages, out of which they and their employers make
contributions to PAYG and FF pension systems; they also earn profits on PUEs and
receive imputed services from their share of the housing stock. Persons in the retirement
age bracket, in addition to receiving wages (if they work), receive annuity income from
the DCPS and OIs based on their assets, annuitize their residential capital and capital of
PUE, and and receive PAYG benefits.
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3.3. Modeling labor and capital flows between sectors
To model the interaction between the formal and informal sectors of the
economy we draw on gravity models, which are widely used in areas ranging from
transport planning to health care (Wilson, 1970, Mayhew and Taket, 1980).
3.3.1. Modeling labor flows
In the case of the labor market we apply the hypothesis that the flow of workers
between sectors is proportional to the labor force of each and inversely depends on the
differences in average net wages. This means, for example, that in an economy where
labor market regulations are poorly enforced and sizes of formal and informal sectors
are close to each other, more people will choose to work in the informal sector if there is
a positive financial inducement to do so in terms of higher after-tax wages.
The model is behavioral in the sense that it reflects current labor market
dynamics and contains a behavioral parameter which must be calibrated from existing
data as far as this is possible. The model functions by updating the size of each sector
between periods based on changes in labor market, demography and wage levels. As
labor markets develop, change and become mature it is possible that the parameter as
well as the size of each sector will alter, although we do not take this possibility into
account here.
There are several forms and specifications of the gravity model available. In our
case we also need to take account of the fact that the number of workers leaving a sector
cannot exceed the number of workers in it and therefore the model must be constrained
accordingly.
Mathematically we represent this process and the constraint on sector size as
follows (time index is suppressed):
,
ψ Li
L
ij
L
j
L
iL
ij
fDW
T =
where
T Lij  is an origin-destination matrix of the number of workers moving from sector i to
sector j;
W Li is the number of workers in sector i;
DLj  is the number of vacancies in sector j which might be potentially occupied by
workers from other sectors;
f Lij  is a deterrent factor, representing the “frictional” effect of a changing sector;
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ψ Li  is a balancing factor ensuring that the number of workers leaving sector i does not
exceed the number of  workers in sector i;
∑=
j
L
ij
L
j
L
i fDψ .
i.e. ij ij
WT =∑
Following the standard approach for this type of models we define f Lij  as an
exponential function
ef cLijLiLij δ= ,
where
c
L
ij  is a change in a worker’s absolute salary resulting from moving from sector i to
sector j;
δ Li  is an exogenous coefficient calibrated on the basis of two years' data.
We assume that those workers who work in the informal sector do not pay either
taxes or legal penalties; those who work in the formal sector are assumed to pay direct
tax and social security payroll contributions. Thus,
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τ
w formal  is an average wage in the formal sector;
w ormalinf  is an average wage in the informal sector;
τ =DirTaxRate+SocSecTaxRate+(1 – TrustFactor)*FFContrRate,
where DirTaxRate is a direct tax rate,
 SocSecTaxRate is a social security payroll tax rate,
 FFContRate is contributions rate to fully-funded pension system,
TrustFactor ∈ [0;1] is a degree to which the population considers contributions to fully-
funded system as a tax (0 corresponds to absence of trust, 1 corresponds to absolute
trust).
According to the evidence, the share of both the formal and the informal sector
in the economy cannot be equal to zero. This means that a situation where all informal
workers move to the formal sector is not possible, neither is the reverse. For the sake of
simplicity we assume that there is some share of total labor which belongs to some
sector and does not move anywhere. This leaves us with
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where α Li  is a minimum share of sector i in total labor.
3.3.2. Modeling capital flows
For modeling capital flows between the formal and informal sectors we use the
same specification of the gravity model as in the case of labor markets:
,
ψ Ki
K
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where
T Kij  is an origin-destination matrix of the number of capital units moving from sector i
to sector j;
W Ki is the number of capital units in sector i;
DKj  is the number of capital units available in sector j;
f Kij  is a deterrent factor representing the ease with which capital can move between
sectors;
ψ Ki  is a balancing factor as before, where
∑=
j
K
ij
K
j
K
i fDψ .
We assume that capital flows between sectors depend on the difference between
the net rates of return to capital in those sectors. Using the same approach as in the case
of labor flows, we define f Cij  as exponential function
ef cKijKiKij δ= ,
where
c
K
ij  is a change in the net rate of return to capital resulting from moving from sector i to
sector j;
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δ Ki is an exogenous coefficient, calibrated on the basis of two years’ data.
We assume that indirect taxes in the formal sector and penalties and bribes in the
informal sector are to be paid out of the returns to capital operated in those sectors.
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r formal  is the rate of return to capital in the formal sector;
r ormalinf  is the rate of return to capital in the informal sector;
λ rate of penalties and bribes paid by entrepreneurs in the informal sector;
µ is an indirect tax rate.
There are four types of capital in our model – capital of private unincorporated
enterprises, residential capital, capital operated by firms and held by the private pension
system, and capital operated by firms and held by other financial institutions. All of
these types of capital are present in the formal sector. We assume the capital of the
fully-funded pension system is by definition formal. We also assume that there are no
other financial institutions in the informal sector. This means that only two types of
capital are present in the informal sector: capital of private unincorporated enterprises
and residential capital. Analogously, with the case of labor flows, we also assume that
some shares of total capital belong to some sectors and do not move anywhere.
The above set of assumptions leads us to expressions for W Ci  and DCj  as follows:
KMKOIsKKPUEW KformalformalformalformalKformal α−++= Re
KMsKKPUEW K ormalormalormalK ormal α infinfinfinf Re −+=
KOIKResKPUED formalformalformalKformal ++=
KResKPUED informalinformalKinformal +=
where
KPUE is capital of private unincorporated enterprises,
KRes is residential capital,
KOI is capital of other institutions,
KM is total “movable” capital,
KResKPUEKOIKResKPUEKM informalinformalformalformalformal ++++=
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In other words, KM is the total capital in the economy out of the capital of fully-
funded pension system.
3.3.3. Modeling capital flight abroad
Under some conditions, including those which might apply to Ukraine, the
informal sector of the economy might perform more effectively than the formal sector.
The question is, what would be the purpose of decreasing informalization in this case?
One of the answers is because informalization promotes capital flight abroad, thus
strongly decelerating economic growth.
The capital flight is a complex economic phenomenon, and its detailed
investigation is far beyond the framework of this paper. However, to present it in the
form of a simple model, we make the following assumption:
ϕ=
Y
K
orm
abroad
inf
where K abroad  is a total capital stock resulting from capital flight abroad5.
This assumption means that if informal output grows, some part of its surplus is
exported from the country, if informal output declines, then some part of the capital
returns.
Let us test this assumption using the data which we have available. Borodiuk
and Turchinov (1999) estimate the total capital stock resulting from capital flight abroad
for the end of 1998 to amount to USD 20-25 billion. Turchinov et al. (1997) estimate
the stock for 1996 to be USD 15-20 billion. We may assume that capital flight before
1992 was zero, because the economy was closed. Taking average values (17.5 billion
for 1996 and 22.5 for 1998) and making a linear interpolation, we can fill data gaps for
the years 1992 – 1998 (the eligibility of the linear interpolation might be confirmed, in
particular, by estimates of Leiter and Tedstrom (1997), who estimated capital flight
from Russia to be constant for every year). Now, using the above mentioned estimates
of the share of the informal sector of the economy and data from the State Committee
for Statistics of Ukraine (1980-1997) on exchange rates, we estimate the output of the
informal sector in USD. Figure 5 shows that our assumption is reasonable and ϕ might
be assumed to equal 0.35.
                                                
5
 As it is virtually impossible to export capital from Ukraine in a legal way, we assume that all capital
installed abroad belongs to the informal sector.
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Figure 5. Dependency between estimated output of the informal sector and
estimated capital abroad.
4. SIMULATIONS
4.1. Set of scenarios
Based on the above considerations, we propose three criteria for each scenario.
The first criterion is based on the size of a fully-funded reformed pension system
tier. We assume that contributions to this tier might be
(1) 7% of formal wages;
(2) 11% of formal wages;
(3) 15% of formal wages.
The second criterion is based on the method of financing the transition. Two
groups of scenarios are worthy of consideration:
(1) the government does not decrease the social security payroll tax (i.e. tax
financing);
(2) the government cuts the social security payroll tax rate by the FF
contribution rate and issues debt for paying pensions to current cohorts of
retirees (i.e. debt financing).
The third criterion is the degree of the public trust in reform. Here there are three
groups of scenarios:
(1) the workers do not consider contributions to the FF DC system as a tax;
(2) the workers consider half of the contributions as a tax;
(3) the workers consider all contributions as a tax.
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Thus, in total there are 18 scenarios. Of course, this still does not cover all the
possible variants of pension reform in the country, and each scenario might have a
different probability of realization. However, these scenarios, by providing a spread of
possible alternatives, allow us to investigate the possible impact of the reform on the
informalization of the economy.
4.2. Simulations results
The simulations were made for a period of 30 years with the reform starting in
the year 2001. Since we have shown earlier that a successful pension reform is unlikely
to be possible unless the retirement age is changed, for all of these simulations we
assumed that the retirement age will be gradually raised and will reach 65 for both sexes
in 2010. We focused primarily on two indicators: share of informal GDP in total GDP
and total GDP itself. Tables 3-4 show the results of the simulations.
Table 3. Simulation results: share of informal output in total GDP.
Type
No. of
transition
FF contribution rate Trust
factor
2000 2010 2020 2030
1 0 0.49 0.44 0.43 0.47
2 7% 0.5 0.49 0.43 0.41 0.45
3 1 0.49 0.42 0.39 0.43
4 Debt- 0 0.49 0.44 0.43 0.46
5 Financed 11% 0.5 0.49 0.42 0.40 0.43
6 1 0.49 0.40 0.37 0.40
7 0 0.49 0.44 0.43 0.46
8 15% 0.5 0.49 0.42 0.40 0.43
9 1 0.49 0.38 0.35 0.38
10 0 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.52
11 7% 0.5 0.49 0.46 0.47 0.50
12 1 0.49 0.45 0.45 0.48
13 0 0.49 0.49 0.53 0.56
14 Tax- 11% 0.5 0.49 0.46 0.47 0.50
15 Financed 1 0.49 0.45 0.45 0.50
16 0 0.49 0.51 0.56 0.60
17 15% 0.5 0.49 0.48 0.51 0.55
18 1 0.49 0.45 0.46 0.51
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Table 4. Simulation results: total GDP, billion 1998 UAH
Type
No. Of FF contribution rate Trust level 2000 2010 2020 2030
Transition
1 0 209 260 330 420
2 7% 0.5 209 261 334 427
3 1 209 262 337 432
4 Debt- 0 209 260 331 422
5 Financed 11% 0.5 209 262 337 431
6 1 209 264 341 438
7 0 209 260 332 423
8 15% 0.5 209 262 337 431
9 1 209 265 344 443
10 0 209 260 330 417
11 7% 0.5 209 262 335 426
12 1 209 264 339 434
13 Tax- 0 209 261 329 411
14 Financed 11% 0.5 209 262 335 426
15 1 209 266 345 443
16 0 209 261 326 401
17 15% 0.5 209 265 340 430
18 1 209 269 351 452
4.3. Discussion of the results
The results of the simulations show that, first, public trust in the reform plays
a crucial role in the reform’s impact on informalization of the economy. Figure 6
illustrates the difference in the informal sector share of GDP for scenarios with a FF
contributions rate of 11%, debt-financed transition, based on different assumptions. On
the other hand, Figure 7 suggests that there is virtually no difference in informalization
for scenarios with debt-financed transition, low trust and different contributions to the
FF tier. The latter fact leads us to the conclusion that most of the effects of pension
reform on the informalization of the economy are due to the shift of labor, not capital,
from the informal to the formal sector.
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Figure 6. Share of informal sector in GDP for scenarios 6 and 14.
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Figure 7. Share of informal sector in GDP for scenarios 1, 4 and 7.
Second, debt-financed transition, according to our simulations, will lead to
stronger decreases in informalization. For example, in the scenarios 5 (debt-financed
transition) and 14 (tax-financed transition), which are in a middle position according to
other criteria (trust level = 0.5, FF contributions rate = 11%), the difference in shares of
the informal sector in GDP grows to 9% in 2030 (Figure 8). For other analogous pairs
of scenarios this difference varies between 5% and 14%. For tax-financed transition the
share of the informal sector in GDP never goes below 45%, whereas for debt-financed
transition it might reach 35%. If we look at the total GDP for each scenario, which
differ only by type of transition, we can see that the total GDP is higher for debt-
financed transition scenarios in all pairs with trust levels 0.5 and 0, and for tax-financed
transition scenarios if the trust level is set to 0. However, the probability of realizing the
scenarios where the level of informalization of the economy remains high and at the
same time trust is also high, is insignificant. Thus, we may reach the conclusion that in
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an economy with a large informal sector long-run efficiency gains of debt-financed
transition are likely to exceed those of tax-financed transition.
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Figure 8. Share of informal sector in GDP for scenarios 5 and 14.
Third, all the above graphs show that after 2020 there is a trend to increase the
share of the informal sector. The reason is the additional burden that is placed on the
formal sector by rising demographic dependency due to population aging. We can see,
however, that successful pension reform with debt-financed transition might alleviate
this problem: Figure 9 compares the share of the informal sector for scenario 1 (debt-
financed, FF contributions = 7%, trust level = 0) and scenario 6 (debt-financed, FF
contributions = 11%, trust level = 1).
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Figure 9. Share of informal sector in GDP for scenarios 1 and 6.
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Finally, our results show that informalization declines and GDP increases
with an increase of the contributions to the FF tier (with other conditions being
equal). However, the public trust in reform also plays an extremely important role:
comparing total GDP for scenarios 5 (debt-financed transition, FF contributions rate =
11%, trust = 0.5), 6 (debt-financed transition, FF contributions rate = 11%, trust = 0),
and 8 (debt-financed transition, FF contributions rate = 15%, trust = 0.5), one can see
that the efficiency gains are higher even in case of a smaller FF pillar if public trust in
reform is higher.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The deterioration of personal and societal morals due to double standards in
behavior in the Soviet era, followed by political liberalization in the absence of
economic reforms and a huge increase of the tax burden, have led to a growing
informalization of the Ukrainian economy during the transition period. Together with a
decline in formal output and an increase in unemployment, informalization became one
of the main reasons for the severe crisis in the Ukrainian PAYG pension system.
Population aging is expected to place additional pressures on the pension system and
could promote even further informalization.  Pension reform based on the introduction
of a fully-funded defined contribution component into the system might alleviate some
of the negative impacts of population aging on the pension system and contribute to the
development of a mature market economy by promoting economic growth and
decreasing incentives to informalize.
Our analysis has shown that public trust in the reform plays a crucial role in
achieving the above-mentioned goal and in the success of the reform in general. Thus,
in designing and implementing any reform special attention should be paid to trust-
increasing measures, including the development of a reliable institutional framework for
reform, comprehensive legislation to underpin and enforce it, and an effective public
relations drive in the media. Investing part of the funds of the fully-funded system
abroad would also increase the trust in the system.
In contrast to OECD-type economies, debt-financed transition to a fully-funded
pension system in a highly informalized post-Soviet economy would, according to the
results of our simulations, lead to higher efficiency gains than would a tax-financed
transition. This is probably due to the decrease in informalization caused by reductions
in the tax burden. The implementation of this type of transition, however, might be
complicated by high public debt and the underdevelopment of capital markets. Thus, for
the first stages of the reform it might be better to invest a considerable part of the funds
of the fully-funded pension system into low-interest government bonds, providing a
smoother shift from one type of pension system to another.
Our results suggest, provided public trust in the reform is sufficient, the larger
the fully-funded pillar of the pension system, the larger the decrease of informalization.
However, if the pillar is too large, the transition might lead either to considerable
increase of public debt and, consequently, to macroeconomic instability, or to the
necessity of investing the bulk of funds of the fully-funded pillar into low interest
government bonds for a long period of time. In both cases public trust in the reform is
likely to decrease, what might diminish the positive impacts of the reform. The
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contribution rate to the fully-funded pillar at the level close to 11% of formal wages
might be considered, taking into account both sides of the problem.
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APPENDIX 1. DESCRIPTION OF THE UKRAINIAN PENSION SYSTEM
Administrative and legislative structure of the pension system
The legislative base of the Ukrainian pension system was formed in a period of
socioeconomic crisis. This resulted in a series of ad-hoc "catching-up" laws, which
caused the pension system to become more complicated and unclear from a public
perspective. The assignment and payment of pensions is based on the Law of Ukraine
"On Pension Maintenance" accepted in 1991, and on some other laws regulating
payment of pensions for certain categories of people (laws "On the Status of People
Deputy", "On the State Service", "On the Status of Judges", "On the Public Prosecutor’s
Office", "On Pensions of Servicemen and the Officers and Men of the Agencies of
Internal Affairs", "On the Status of War Veterans and Guarantees of their Social
Security", "On the Basic Principles of Social Security of Labor Veterans and Other
Elderly Citizens", Custom Code of Ukraine). Funding of the pension system is regulated
by the Law of Ukraine "On Tax for Mandatory State Pension Insurance" adopted in
1997.
In April 1998 the president of Ukraine affirmed the Basic Principles of Pension
Reform in Ukraine. According to the Basic Principles, the main tasks of the pension
reform in Ukraine are to:
• implement the constitutional rights of citizens to social security;
• create conditions for the development of insurance principles in the pension system;
• increase the personal interest and personal responsibility of the worker for his/her
living standard after retirement;
• take into account a worker’s career in determining pension levels;
• reduce demographic pressure on the financial basis of the pension system;
• introduce a non-state pension insurance.
The Basic Principles stipulate the multistage introduction of a multipillar
pension system in Ukraine. The pension reform is expected to have three stages.
In the first stage it is planned to carry out the reform of a mandatory pension
insurance, decrease the number of preferential treatments and compensations in the
pension system, divide financial sources for different types of pensions, liquidate debts
in pensions payments, and develop a system of the minimum state social standards.
During the second stage the reform of the administrative structure of the pension
system should be maintained, an additional non-state pension should be introduced,
social pensions should be transferred to the system of social assistance, and in favorable
conditions the defined-benefit pension system should be introduced.
The third stage stipulates providing minimum social standards for the population
and full realization of the multipillar pension system.
The administrative structure of the pension system includes three organizations.
The Ministry of Labor and Social Policy is responsible for setting state policy
and developing drafts of laws in the field of the pension system, assigning and
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calculating the pension level according to legislative regulations, controlling the use of
the funds of the pension fund of Ukraine, developing international cooperation in the
field of the pension system, and promoting the development of non-state pension
systems.
The pension fund collects the social security contributions into the fund through
its regional branches and keeps them on account in a special postal-pension bank.
The ministry of communications provides pension payments through the local
post offices.
According to the Basic Principles of Pension Reform in Ukraine, the functions
of assigning and paying state labor pensions are expected to be fulfilled by the pension
fund of Ukraine after the implementation of individualized registration of contribution
for obligatory state pension insurance.
In April 1999 the Prime Minister of Ukraine issued a decree creating an Inter-
Agency Expert Working Group for Pension Reform – a national expert committee
advising the government on pension reform. The Working Group has developed two
draft laws which are expected to be cornerstones of pension reform legislation – “On
mandatory pension insurance” and “On non-state pension funds”, and the draft laws
were submitted to the Parliament for consideration.
Types and criteria of pension assignment and pension level calculation
According to the law of Ukraine "On Pension Maintenance", there are two basic
types of pensions: labor pensions and social pensions.
Labor pensions include four types of pensions: old-age pensions, invalidity
pensions, survivor pensions, and time-of-service pensions.
Old-age pensions are assigned to people who have reached retirement age and
have the necessary working record. The level of an old-age pension is 55% of the
average monthly wage, but cannot be less than the minimum pension. The pension is to
be increased by 1% each full year of service, but this increment cannot be more than
75% of the pension. The minimum pension is defined by the parliament, the maximum
is three times (for representatives of some professions and persons having suffered from
the Chernobyl disaster – four times) more than the minimum pension. If the working
record is not sufficient, the level of pension is pro-rata-tempore of the full pension, but
not less than 30% of the minimum old-age pension.
Invalidity pensions are assigned to people who have partially or totally lost their
working capacity. To be eligible for invalidity pensions one should have a working
record of 1 - 15 years depending on age. Depending on the degree of capacity loss,
disabled persons are categorized into three groups. The invalidity pension level is for
group 1, 70% of earnings; for group 2, 60% of earnings; and for group 3, 40% of
earnings. The minimum labor invalidity pension is equal to the social pension for the
respective disability group; the maximum pension is three (four) times the minimum.
Survivor pensions are assigned to disabled dependents of the deceased worker.
The level of pension is 30% of the worker's earnings, but not less than the social
pension for the respective category of disabled.
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The years-of-service pensions are assigned to people whose professions might
cause the loss of their working capacity prior to their normal retirement age. The service
pension level is determined analogously with the age pension level.
Average monthly wages for determining the levels of labor pensions are
calculated (according to the choice of the person requesting a pension) either over the
last 24 months of work without interruption before retirement, or over 60 months of
work without interruption during the whole working career. Earnings exceeding 10
minimum wages are not considered for the pension level determination. That part of the
earnings which is not higher than four minimum wages is taken into full account, the
fifth minimum wage is calculated with a coefficient 0.85, the sixth minimum wage with
a coefficient 0.7, the seventh with 0.55, the eighth with 0.40, the ninth with 0.25, and
the tenth with 0.15.
According to the laws of Ukraine, there is an exception for some state workers
whose pensions are placed at the level of 50% to 90% of their earnings without a
maximum limit.
War veterans and persons having special labor services are entitled to receive an
increment for their pension at a level from 50% to 400% of the minimum labor age
pension.
Social pensions are assigned to invalids, persons having reached retirement age,
and children who lose the working parent’s income, if they do not have an entitlement
to labor pensions. The social pension level for different categories of beneficiaries are
from 30% to 200% of the minimum old-age pension.
Retirement age and working record
The retirement age in Ukraine is 60 years for men and 55 years for women. The
working record necessary to get a full pension is 25 years for men and 20 years for
women. For people with dangerous jobs, the retirement age is decreased to 55 years for
men and 50 years for women, and the necessary working record is decreased to 20 and
15 years for men and women, respectively. According to the Ukrainian laws, the periods
when a person does not contribute to the pension fund (military service, studying at the
university, childcare) are also included in the working record. People who reach
retirement age have a right to pension payment regardless of whether they continue to
work or not.
Social Security taxes and expenses of the pension fund
According to the law, employers must contribute 32% of the total wages of their
companies to the pension fund (if employees of the company have a right to preferential
treatment, this rate is higher), employees contribute 1% of the wage, and self-employed
workers and lawyers pay 32% of their earnings (until February 1996 - 9%). The
reserves of the pension fund are not included in the state budget, other budgets, and
funds. The only admissible operation directed toward reproduction of the fund reserves
is a purchase of state securities.
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Funds of the pension fund are spent as follows:
• Payment of the labor and social pensions specified by the law;
• Child care assistance and under-age child assistance, defined by the law;
• Additional monetary payments to the retirees due to retail price increases;
• Realization of the state programs in the field of social support of retirees, disabled,
children, and other categories of people;
• Organization of current activities, supply of equipment, maintenance of managerial
structures of the pension fund, and providing population with information about
activities of the pension fund.
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APPENDIX 2. SELECTED MODEL PARAMETERS AND ASSUMPTIONS
Demographic assumptions
According to the central scenario developed by the IIASA Population Project for
European ex-USSR countries (Lutz, 1996), we assumed that fertility in Ukraine will
increase to 17 per 1,000 women, and the life expectancy will increase to 67.1 years for
men and 78.8 for women by the year 2030. The IIASA population projection model was
used to provide assumptions on the age structure of the population.
Based on ILO estimates, the labor age participation rate for all cohorts of the
working age population is assumed to be 0.75. The labor force participation rate for the
retired population is assumed to be 0.15 (data for Ukraine in 1996). We assume that due
to the stabilization of the economy it will decrease to 0.07 in 2040.
The production functions
Parameters of production functions of the formal and informal sectors were
calculated based on official data of the State Committee for Statistics of Ukraine (1980-
1997) on formal GDP, formal average wage, labor force, and capital stock, and
estimations of those parameters for the informal sector in 1998 (output and average
wage in informal sector were assumed to be equal to the output and average after-tax
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• might be explained, first, by the fact
that labor costs in Ukraine are very low in comparison with cost of capital, and second,
by the low precision of national statistics on capital stock.
Social security contribution rates
Contributions to FF pension system are assumed to be 0 until 2001. The social
security contribution rate was 33% (16.5%); the employers share was 0.97.
Consumption/saving rates
According to State Committee for Statistics of Ukraine (1980-1997), the savings
of households were about 2.4% of their income. Taking into account this information,
we assume that for the working-age population’s propensity to consume, the disposable
wage income, entrepreneurial income, and transfers/bequests was 0.99, 0.7, and 0.7,
respectively, in 1998, which will decrease to 0.95, 0.5, and 0.5, respectively, by 2030.
For the retirement age population we assume that all income was consumed in 1998,
and the consumption rate of wage income is assumed to decrease to 0.95 in 2030.
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Taxes and government consumption
According to data of the State Committee for Statistics of Ukraine (1980-1997),
the direct tax rate (relative to wages and profits) was 0.17 in 1998. The indirect tax rate
(relative to GDP) was 0.36. Government consumption was 42% of GDP in 1998.
Residential investment and investment in PUE
The share of net domestic savings allocated to residential investment is assumed
to be 20%. The share of private unincorporated enterprises in total investment is
assumed to be 20%.
Initializing capital stocks
According to data of the State Committee for Statistics of Ukraine (1980-1997),
the total capital was 848 billion hryvnias in 1998, and the residential capital was 165
billion hryvnias (19.5%). The capital of private unincorporated enterprises can be
estimated as 85 billion hryvnias (10%), and the capital of the fully-funded defined-
contribution pension system is assumed to be 0. Therefore, the capital of other financial
institutions is assumed to be 598 billion hryvnias (70.5%). Capital abroad was assumed
to be 135 billion hryvnias.
Initializing distribution of labor and capital between the formal and informal
sectors
Based on data of the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy on the number of
people contributing to the pension fund, we estimate the share of informal labor in
Ukraine to be 0.35.  Since most of enterprises in the country take part in both the formal
and informal sectors operating the same capital, we assume that share of informal
capital is 0.5.
